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a b s t r a c t
The aim of this paper is to study theWalrasian equilibriumproblemwhen the data are time
dependent. For this model an existence result is provided using the variational inequality
theory in infinite dimensional spaces. Our results are the generalization of some of the
results obtained by several authors in the static case (see e.g. Donato et al. (2008) [5],
Donato et al. (2008) [4] and Mordukhovich (2006) [11], Nagurney (1993) [2] and the
references therein).
© 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Dynamic competitive equilibrium problem
In this paper we are concerned with the dynamic Walrasian economic equilibrium problem with utility functions. The
equilibrium conditions are expressed in terms of a quasi-variational inequality in a suitable Lebesgue space; thanks to
this formulation we are able to study the equilibrium problem by means of the variational inequality theory in infinite
dimensional spaces. In recent years, the variational approach has been useful to the study of several equilibrium problems
originating from economies, finance, game theory, network theory, etc. (see e.g. [1–5,11]).
In our introductionwedefine a dynamicWalrasian equilibriumproblem. Let us consider amarketplace of ldifferent goods
indexed by j and n agents indexed by a in the period of time [0, T ]; let eja(t) and xja(t) denote, respectively, the nonnegative
endowment and consumption by agent a relative to the commodity j at the time t . We suppose that each agent a is at
least endowed with a positive quantity of commodity (survivability assumption). Let pj(t) denote the nonnegative price
associated to commodity j at the time t . By grouping the introduced quantities in vectors one has that the total endowment
vector ea, the consumption vector xa and the price vector p belong to the Hilbert space L2([0, T ],Rl) = L and the matrix of
consumption by market x = {xa}a=1,...,n belongs to L2([0, T ],Rn×l). In this market, where competitive behaviour prevails,
the agents’ preferences, relative to consumption x at the time t , are expressed by the utility function ua(t, xa) defined on
[0, T ] × Rl measurable in t and continuous with respect to xa. We suppose that the functions ∂ua
∂xja
exist and are measurable
in t and continuous with respect to xa. Further we require that for all a = 1, . . . , n the following growth condition holds:
| − ∇ua(t, xa(t))| ≤ αa(t)‖xa‖L + β(t) ∀xa ∈ L a.e. in [0, T ], (1)
where αa ∈ L∞([0, T ]) and βa ∈ L2([0, T ]) are nonnegative functions. Finally we suppose that ua(t, xa) is concave.
We can now give the following definition of an equilibrium for a dynamic competitive economy:
Definition 1.1. The pair (p, x) is a dynamic competitive equilibrium if and only if for all a = 1, . . . , n
Ua(xa) = max
xa∈Ma(p)
∫ T
0
ua(t, xa(t))dt, (2)
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where
Ma(p) = {xa ∈ L : xja(t) ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , l, a.e. in [0, T ], 〈p, xa − ea〉L ≤ 0},
and for all j = 1, 2, . . . , l:
z j(p)(t) =
n∑
a=1
(
(xja(p))(t)− eja(t)
) ≤ 0 a.e. in [0, T ], (3)
where P = {p ∈ L : pj(t) ≥ 0, ∀j = 1, . . . , l, ∑lj=1 pj(t) = 1 a.e. in [0, T ]}.
Condition (2) states that the aim of each of the agents is to maximize its utility function during the whole period of
time [0, T ] by performing the exchange of goods under the natural constraint Ma(p): the amount that each agent pays for
acquiring the goods is at most the amount that each agent receives as his initial endowment. For each commodity, the
choices must turn out to be such that the total consumption does not exceed the total endowment. Condition (3) states that
the difference between the total consumption and the total endowment, that represents the excess demand, must not be
greater than zero.
We suppose that for all p ∈ P , utility functions satisfy the following condition:
∀xa ∈ Ma(p) ∇ua(t, xa(t)) 6= 0 a.e. in [0, T ], (4)
∀xa ∈ Ma(p) such that xsa(t) = 0 in E, ∀E ⊆ [0, T ], m(E) > 0, it results
∂ua(t, xa(t))
∂xsa
> 0 in E.
From assumption (4) we can deduce that the market is regulated byWalras’ law, that is: 〈p, xa− ea〉L = 0, ∀p ∈ P . We have
the following characterization (see e.g. [6]):
Theorem 1.1. The pair (p, x) ∈ P×M(p) is a dynamic competitive equilibrium of a pure exchange economic market with utility
function if and only if it is a solution to the evolutionary quasi-variational inequality
n∑
a=1
〈∇ua(xa), xa − xa〉L +
〈
n∑
a=1
(xa(p)− ea), p− p
〉
L
≤ 0 ∀(p, x) ∈ P ×M(p). (5)
2. Existence of dynamic competitive equilibrium
In this section we are concerned with the problem of the existence of the dynamic competitive equilibrium. This result
is proven by assuming that, for all a = 1, . . . , n, the operator−∇ua(xa) is strongly monotone:
∃ν > 0 〈−∇ua(xa)+∇ua(ya), xa − ya〉L ≥ ν‖xa − ya‖2L ∀xa, ya ∈ Ma(p) (6)
and that the following condition on the prices holds:
lim|h|→0
∫ T
0
‖p(t + h)− p(t)‖2dt = 0 uniformly in p.
Then we define
P˜ =
{
p ∈ L2([0, T ],Rl) : pj(t) ≥ 0 ∀j = 1, . . . , l,
l∑
j=1
pj(t) = 1 a.e. in [0, T ],
lim
h→0
∫ T
0
‖p(t + h)− p(t)‖2dt = 0 uniformly in p, p(t) = 0 if t 6∈ [0, T ]
}
.
Weobserve that (p, x) ∈ P×M(p) is a solution to evolutionary quasi-variational inequality (5) if and only if x is a solution
to evolutionary variational inequality
〈−∇ua(xa), xa − xa〉L ≥ 0, ∀xa ∈ Ma(p), (7)
and p is a solution to evolutionary variational inequality〈
n∑
a=1
(ea − xa(p)), p− p
〉
L
≥ 0 ∀p ∈ P˜. (8)
Firstly we consider for all p ∈ P˜ and for all a = 1, . . . , n the evolutionary variational inequality (7). We observe that from
assumptions of−∇ua, for all p ∈ P˜ (see e.g. [7]) there is xa, the unique solution to evolutionary variational inequality
〈−∇ua(xa), xa − xa〉L ≥ 0 ∀xa ∈ Ma(p). (9)
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Therefore, the demand function arises xa(p) ∀p ∈ P˜ . Now in order to achieve a regularity result for the demand function
xa(p)we need to recall the concept of set convergence in the sense of Mosco:
Definition 2.1 ([8]). Let (V , ‖ · ‖) be an Hilbert space K ⊂ V a closed, nonempty, convex set. A sequence of nonempty,
closed, convex sets Kn converges to K as n→+∞, i.e. Kn → K, if and only if
(M1) for any H ∈ K there is a sequence {Hn}n∈N strongly converging to H in V such that Hn lies in Kn for all n,
(M2) for any {Hkn}n∈N weakly converging to H in V , such that Hkn lies in Kkn for all n, then the weak limit H belongs to K.
Lemma 2.1. Let {pn}n∈N ⊆ P˜ strongly converge to p; then the sequence of sets {Ma(pn)}n∈N converges to Ma(p).
Proof. See e.g. [5,6]. 
We have the following result:
Theorem 2.1. In our assumptions the demand function xa(·) is continuous on P˜.
Proof. Let {pn}n∈N ⊆ P˜ strongly converge to p. It will be proven that the sequence {xa(pn)} is weakly converging to xa(p),
where, ∀n ∈ N, xa(pn) ∈ Ma(pn) is the unique solution to evolutionary variational inequality:
〈−∇ua(xa(pn)), xa − xa(pn)〉L ≥ 0, ∀xa ∈ Ma(pn). (10)
From Lemma 2.1 if {pn}n∈N ⊆ P˜ strongly converges to p, {Ma(pn)}n∈N converges to Ma(p) in Mosco’s sense. Taking into
account the condition (M1) of convergence in Mosco’s sense: for xa(p) ∈ Ma(p) there is a sequence {ya(pn)} strongly
converging to xa(p) such that ya(pn) ∈ Ma(pn). Then it follows that:
‖ya(pn)‖L < h1. (11)
Moreover, from growth condition and being −∇ua(t, xa(t)) continuous respect to xa, it follows that {−∇ua(t, ya(pn))}
converges strongly to−∇ua(t, xa(p)); thus:
‖ − ∇ua(ya(pn))‖L < h2. (12)
Since−∇ua(·) is a strongly monotone operator, choosing in (6), xa = xa(pn) and ya = ya(pn), for all n ∈ Nwe have:
〈−∇ua(xa(pn))+∇ua(ya(pn)), xa(pn)− ya(pn)〉L ≥ ν‖xa(pn)− ya(pn)‖2L . (13)
From (13), (12) and (10), for all n ∈ N, we have:
‖xa(pn)− ya(pn)‖2L ≤
1
ν
〈−∇ua(xa(pn))+∇ua(ya(pn)), xa(pn)− ya(pn)〉L
= 1
ν
〈−∇ua(xa(pn)), xa(pn)− ya(pn)〉L + 1
ν
〈∇ua(ya(pn)), xa(pn)− ya(pn)〉L
≤ 1
ν
‖∇ua(ya(pn))‖L · ‖xa(pn)− ya(pn)‖L ≤ h2
ν
‖xa(pn)− ya(pn)‖L;
hence
‖xa(pn)− ya(pn)‖L ≤ h2
ν
. (14)
Then {xa(pn)} is bounded because from (11) and (14), for all n ∈ N, one has:
‖xa(pn)‖L ≤ ‖xa(pn)− ya(pn)‖L + ‖ya(pn)‖L ≤ h2
ν
+ h1 = h.
Therefore, there is a subsequence {xa(pkn)}n∈N weakly convergent to ya, with xa(pkn) ∈ Ma(pkn). We prove now that ya is
the solution of evolutionary variational inequality (9). From condition (M2) of convergence in Mosco sense, it follows that
ya ∈ Ma(p). For all xa ∈ Ma(p), by condition (M1), there is {xa(pn)}n∈N such that xa(pn) ∈ Ma(pn) and xa(pn)→ xa. The result
is that: xa(pkn)− xa(pkn) ⇀ xa − ya; and from the continuity and the growth condition of−∇ua(·):−∇ua(xa(pkn))→−∇ua(xa); hence:
〈−∇ua(xa(pkn)), xa(pkn)− xa(pkn)〉L → 〈−∇ua(xa), xa − ya〉L.
Because xa(pkn) ∈ Ma(pkn), xa(pkn) is the solution to variational inequality (10) in Ma(pkn) and by the Minty’s Lemma, it
follows that 〈−∇ua(xa(pkn)), xa(pkn)− xa(pkn)〉L ≥ 0; then:
〈−∇ua(xa), xa − ya〉L ≥ 0 ∀xa ∈ Ma(p).
So, from Minty’s Lemma, ya is the solution to variational inequality (9): ya = xa(p). In the same way, we have that every
subsequence converging of {xa(pn)} converges to the same limit xa(p). Then xa(pn) is weakly converging to xa(p). 
M.B. Donato et al. / Applied Mathematics Letters 23 (2010) 148–151 151
Now we can prove our main result:
Theorem 2.2. In our assumptions there is a (p, x) ∈ P ×M(p) solution to evolutionary quasi-variational inequality (5).
Proof. In Theorem2.1 the existence of a unique solution to (9)was proven; therefore, it is possible define the excess demand
function: z(p) =∑na=1(xa(p)− ea). Now, evolutionary variational inequality (8) is taken into consideration and proven that
z is hemicontinuous on P˜ . For all {pn}n∈N ⊆ P˜ such that pn → p by Theorem 2.1 the result is xa(pn) ⇀ xa(p). So, for all q ∈ P˜
we have:
n∑
a=1
(ea − xa(pn)) ⇀
n∑
a=1
(ea − xa(p)), q− pn → q− p;
hence: 〈∑na=1(ea − xa(pn)), q− pn〉L → 〈∑na=1(ea − xa(p)), q− p〉L; namely, for all q ∈ P˜ , the function: p→ 〈∑na=1(ea −
xa(p)), q− p〉L is continuous. Then the operator z(p) is hemicontinuous. Let us observe that, since P˜ is a closed and bounded
set, (see e. g. [9]) it follows that P˜ is a compact set. Then, by Theorem 5.1 of [10] choosing A = P˜ and B = ∅, there exists p
solution to evolutionary variational inequality (8). Hence (x(p), p) is a solution to evolutionary quasi-variational inequality
(5), namely (x(p), p) is a dynamic competitive equilibrium. 
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